The Consequences of Party Leadership Change on Democratic Elections*

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Abstract

This paper examines the effects of party leadership turnover on elections in advanced democracies. I use an original dataset comprised of large political parties in 10 OECD countries to investigate whether the presence of new party leaders alters the party's policy position and influences democratic election outcomes. It finds the following. First, the presence of new party leaders affect vote shares in the next general election. New leaders of parties in government significantly decrease vote shares. While new opposition party leaders significantly increase vote shares in countries with single-member districts, (SMDs), new opposition party leaders significantly decreases vote shares in multi-member districts (MMDs). I also find that the presence of new party leaders is correlated with changes in the party policy position.

1. Introduction

In 1983, Labour Party Leader and Leader of the Opposition, 70-year-old Michael Foot, failed to prevent the Conservative Party from winning a second term in government. The Labour Party manifesto for that election was dubbed "the longest suicide note in history." Also, during his tenure, his approval ratings were the worst of all post-WWII Labour Party Leaders (UK Gallup Polls). In 2001, 40-year-old William Hague, Conservative Party Leader and Leader of the Opposition, failed to prevent the Labour Party from winning a consecutive landslide victory. While his approval ratings were higher than Foot's, Hague's personality and leadership skills were the objects of media ridicule (The Economist). Turning our attention to a success story, in the 1979 General Election, 53-year-old Margaret Thatcher, UK Conservative Party Leader and Leader of the Opposition, led her party into government on her first election as a party leader. Similarly, in the 1997 General Election, 44-year-old Tony Blair, UK Labour Party Leader and Leader of the Opposition, led his party into Labour's biggest victory, also on his first election as a party leader, winning 157 more seats than the previous election. All the aforementioned party leaders first took office after a previous election loss, where the party was generally thought of as "in trouble." Yet, while Foot and Hague failed to lead their parties into government, Thatcher and Blair succeeded in doing so.

This paper examines the consequences of party leadership change on democratic elections. The literature on democratic elections often focuses on the role of the economy and party ideology on public opinion during elections, or how partisanship and campaigns shape election outcomes. While all these aspects are important determinants of vote choice, the effects of changes within party organization on election outcomes remain a largely unexplored topic. For example, re-organization of party hierarchy structure can be correlated with a change in the party policy position, especially if it affects the identity of party members who are given the right to approve election manifestos. Or, a change in party leadership can be correlated with a change in how voters view the party, especially if the media focuses on party leaders during the election campaign. If this is indeed the case, then new party leaders may affect election outcomes. As the literature on party organization increasingly points to the importance of party leaders, this paper examines how new party leaders influence elections. The central question it asks is, do changing party leaders affect the party's ideology and vote share during the next general election?

I begin the study with a summary of the relevant literature on party leadership and democratic elections. Next, I present statistical analyses on the link between new party leaders and election outcomes in 10 OECD countries. I conclude with a discussion of the role of electoral institutions and potential endogeneity issues.

2. The Importance of Party Leaders

News reports on elections suggest that party leaders matter. In the 1992 UK General Election, the majority of voters interviewed stated that in terms of policy, they prefer the Labour Party. Yet they preferred John Major, Prime Minister from the Conservative Party, to remain as Prime Minister (The UK Gallup Poll). Labour was seen as a better alternative, yet its leader, Neil Kinnock, was seen as a poor choice to govern the country.

Recent research on political parties highlights party leaders' increased salience in party policy positions and election success. Farrell and Webb (2000) find that in since the 1980s, party leaders in OECD countries play an increasingly important role in election campaigns, where voters look to these leaders for the party image and campaign message (135). While they also state that party leadership selection is becoming more democratic across countries, leaders hold considerable control over various aspects of participating in an election. Scarrow, Farrell, and Webb (2000) also find that leaders of electoral parties have considerable power in drafting election manifestos (145-146). Raunio (2002) argues that European integration, coupled with the increased disorganization of party membership structure, consolidates party leaders' agenda-setting power. This effect is heightened in countries with weak parliamentary control over European integration (411).

Party leaders' personality and character traits—mainly, competence and charisma—also seem to influence election outcomes[1]. Bean and Mughan (1989), for example, find that in the 1987 Australian federal election and the 1983 United Kingdom general election, party leaders' effectiveness, the ability to listen to reason, being caring, and adhering to principles are significant predictors of party vote choice[2]. Leadership personality also seems to matter in a coalition government setting. Midtbø's (1997) study of the 1993 Norwegian election suggests that Norwegian voters do take into account leadership personality traits when deciding which party to vote for. With data from 35 election studies in seven OECD countries, Bittner (2008) finds that the decision to vote for a particular party includes

[1] Many case studies on leadership personality examine national election studies to determine that competence and charisma are the two main leadership traits that voters care about. See Bean and Mughan (1989); Stewart and Carty (1993); Jones and Hudson (1996); Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato (1996); Midtbø (1997); Curtice and Blais (2001); Blais et al. (2001); Gidengil et al. (2000); Bartle and Crewe (2002); Kabashima and Ryosuke (2002); King ed. (2002); Evans and Anderson (2005); Jenssen and Aalberg (2006); van der Brug, Wouter, and Mughan (2007); Aart, Kees, and Blais (2009).

[2] Leadership traits contribute to a 5.8% vote advantage for the UK Conservative Party and a 3.7% advantage to the Australian Labor Party; these results hold when they control for party identification, and they apply to both ruling and opposition party leaders (1172).

evaluations of that party leader's personality traits. For example, holding all other variables (including partisanship) at their means, the probability of voting for a Conservative party leader increases by 46% if the leader's evaluation increases by one standard deviation above the Conservative mean from one standard deviation below the mean; this probability increases by 43% for center-left parties (2008: 113). It is worthwhile to note that not only are the magnitude of effects quite large, her findings suffer from an endogeneity problem: a party who suffered an election loss may choose a leader with better personality traits.

Party leaders' tenures are also susceptible to election outcomes. Andrews and Jackman (2008) examine party leaders in six OECD countries and find that party leaders are more likely to exit office if the election did not result in the party entering government. My previous (2009) analysis of party leadership tenure in nine OECD countries, using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model, has similar findings[3]. Opposition party leaders and leaders whose parties lost ruling status have the highest risk of exiting office.

These findings suggest that parties have certain expectations of their leaders in terms of election performance: party leaders who cannot lead their parties into government after an election will, very likely, be replaced. If we assume that replacing leaders involves transaction costs, then it should follow that parties avoid doing so unless they expect it to be beneficial to the party. It is possible that parties change leaders as an attempt to improve their performance in the next election. Further theoretical and empirical exploration into party leadership turnover is necessary to advance the literature on democratic elections. What effects do replacing leaders have on the party's electoral fortunes, and does the answer depend on institutional and strategic contexts, such as electoral system and intraparty strife? The remainder of this paper addresses this question: do new party leaders influence election results and party ideology?

3. The Consequences of Party Leadership Change

I focus on two possible ways that new party leaders may influence election outcomes. The first is in their ability to get votes. I posit that parties with new leaders—i.e., leaders that have never led the party into a general election—are more likely to lose votes than leaders who previously led the party into a general election, either because the circumstances that led to a change of leadership were electorally unfavorable, or because the new party leaders lack experience in the national spotlight and are more likely to commit media-related gaffes. If I am correct, statistical results should show that the presence of new leaders decreases the party's vote share. New party leaders may also influence party policy positions via the election manifesto. Electing new leaders may go hand in hand with policy reorientation,

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[3] Results available upon request.

though I have not found literature addressing this. If so, then parties with new leaders should also alter their policy positions.

Besides party leadership, one can imagine a number of factors influencing election outcomes and party policy positions. Fist, party leaders who have been in office longer may be more experienced campaigners or more able to adapt to changes in the current electorate's ideological orientation, yet they may also be more rigid than new leaders in their willingness to approve and/or initiate a reorientation in the party's ideology and policy position. Second, large parties operating in single member districts may experience more stable vote shares than in multi-member districts. Third, literature on democratic elections suggests that the economy is a major determinant of election outcomes: a bad economy hurt the governing party[4]. Although, the relationship is not straightforward[5], the economy is a necessary control for my analyses. Fourth, besides the state of economy, a shift in the party's ideological position may influence its vote share at the next election[6]. Fifth, over time, election outcomes and policy changes may be less volatile as parties become more established and party systems become more stable. Finally, left-leaning parties may differ from right-leaning ones in vote volatility or policy program changes. Thus, I include the above as controls.

3.1 Data Collection

3.1.1 Universe of Cases

I collect data from in the following 10 OECD countries—Australia, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—with a total of 21 parties. Together, they include both single- and multi-member districts. Party leaders are easily identified in these countries and they are *de facto* prime minister candidates. Germany is the exception, which I explain in detail in the next section. While in parliamentary systems voters do not elect the prime minister, with the exception of Sweden's Moderate Party and Center Party, all party leaders in these countries become prime ministers if their party enters the government. Lastly, leaders of opposition parties are all members of the parliament.

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[4] For examples of empirical evidence and comparative case studies, see Harrington Jr. (1993); Børre (1997); Alvarez et al. (2000); Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2000); Blais et al. (2001); Anderson (2006); Burden (2008); and Duch and Stevenson (2008).

[5] See Nordhaus (1975); Alesina (1987); Beck (1987); Heckelman and Berument (1998); Rogoff (1990); Cargill and Hutchinson (1991); Alesina et al. (1997); and Drazen (2000).

[6] See Ezrow (2005), Tavits (2007), Adams et al. (2004), Somer-Topcu (2009), and Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2010).

I include all party leaders who first came to power after 1944. I do not include interim party leaders, nor do I include periods of authoritarian rule. Thus, for Portugal and Spain, the starting years of analyses are 1976 and 1977, respectively. Japan is a special case. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won every election from 1960 to 1993, and after electoral reform, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), did not form until 1996. Thus, the time span for the latter party ranges from 1996 to the present.

Electoral concerns may not be the dominant motivation for smaller, single-issue parties; in addition, these parties' internal organization may differ from those of large, elecotral parties[7]. Therefore, the unit of analysis is a major political party during an election. I define a major political party as one of the two parties who received the largest vote shares in the previous election[8]. In all countries except Ireland and Sweden, the two parties who receive the largest vote shares are the left- and right-wing parties that hold the largest number of seats in the legislature. In Sweden, the two parties winning the largest vote shares are not always the same; thus, I also include the third largest party. None of the ten countries' parties changed their status as major political parties over the time span studied.

3.1.2 Identifying Party Leaders

With respect to identifying party leaders, one option is to define a party leader as the party's highest-ranking officeholder. However, there are some problems with this approach. First, some parties have the titles "President," "Secretary General," "Leader of X Party," and "Parliamentary Party Leader," and it is often difficult to determine *a priori* which titles hold a more significant political role. Second, the relative importance of these positions is different across parties. As my definition should yield the universe of cases that are relevant to my theoretical question, my set of party leaders should be publicly visible: the public should think of them as either leader of the government party or of the opposition party.

I define a party leader as one who meets all of the following qualifications. 1) He or she is a member of the parliament and/or holds the prime ministership, the presidency, or the chancellorship; 2) he or she holds the official title of "Secretary General," "President," "Leader of X Party," or "Parliamentary Party Leader;" and 3) the title that the party leader holds must have a history of producing *de facto* prime minister or chancellorship candidates more than 50% of the elections in the dataset. For example, in Spain's *Partitdo Socialista*

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[7] According to Strøm and Müller (1999), an electoral party concerns itself with winning office, whether as a means of promoting policy, or an end in itself. See Katz and Mair (1995) for differences between these parties and single-issue parties.

[8] In my dataset, the only exception to this rule is Canada's Progressive Conservative Party, who lost 151 seats during the 1993 Federal Election. I choose to include this party because it was the governing party at the time of that election.

Obrero Español (PSOE), there is both a position of President and Secretary General. I choose the Secretary General as this party's leader because all holders of this position are also members of the parliament, and because this is the position that all prime ministerial candidates are drawn from.

In my dataset, Germany is the only country where the chancellor candidate is not always drawn from the party chairman. The German case presents a theoretical complication. For *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) and *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU), at times the chancellor candidate is not the "*SPD-Vorsitzende*" (SPD Chairman) or "*CDU-Vorsitzende*" (CDU Chairman). The non-candidate chairmen are as follows. Willy Brandt of SPD stood was the nominal party leader but not the chancellor candidate from 1974 to 1987. Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD leader from 1987 to 1991, did not stand as the chancellor candidate at the 1990 Federal Election. Oskar Lafontaine, SPD leader from 1996 to 1999, did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 1998 Federal Election. Conrad Adenauer, CDU leader from 1950 to 1966, did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 1965 Federal Election. Helmut Kohl, CDU leader from 1972 to 1998, did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 1980 and 1981 Elections. Finally, CDU's Angela Merkel did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 2002 Election. Using the above definition, I would choose the SPD and CDU chairmen as the party leaders since the majority of candidates are drawn from these positions.

There may be theoretical reasons why some chairmen are not selected as the chancellor candidate. Thus, I provide the following alternative definition. The leader must be the party's designated chancellor candidate or the *de facto* prime minister candidate (via official party statements). If there is no officially designated candidate, then the former definition applies. This means that out of the 363 observations in the dataset, 13 observations, all German cases, would be coded differently. I ran statistical analyses using both sets of definitions, the first of which are presented in the results section. I also ran analyses without Germany, and the results show no significant differences from tests that include German party leaders. These results are available upon request.

All variables are coded using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (2006), Keesings Online Archives, OECD Statistics Portal, official party websites, and Wikipedia. I use official party websites to locate the names and official titles of the party leaders. For each party, I searched for "President," "Secretary General," "Party Leader," and "Parliamentary Party Leader" to determine what the party calls its leader, then I search for the names of the leaders that have held this position since the party's first participation in a post-1945 election. If the website does not contain an English version, I used Google Translator to translate the page into English. If the website does not provide the complete list of past and present leaders, I searched Wikipedia to find the names of the leaders that hold this title. I then took each of these names and ran a search in Keesings Archives Online,

which provides articles that state the names of party leaders and dates of office tenure, to double check the titles they hold and determine their dates of tenure[9]. Table 1 presents the list of party leaders' official titles. Table 2 presents the parties' names and dates studied.

[TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]

3.1.3 Variables and Variable Coding:

My dependent variables are 1) *Party Vote Share Change* and 2) *Magnitude of Left-Right Policy Change*, both taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). *Party Vote Share Change* is the percent change in the official party vote share for the country's legislature[10] from all electoral districts, from the previous general election. *Magnitude of Left-Right Policy Change* is the absolute change, from 0 to 100, in CMP's coding of the Left-Right party ideology ("rile") from the previous general election. I employ a standard left-right dimension not only because opinion polls suggest that voters conceptualize party ideology mainly in this dimension (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009a; 2009b), but also because left-right ideology is the main dimension that is comparable across countries.

My explanatory variable is *New Leader,* which is a binary variable coded 1 if the party has elected a new leader since the last general election, and 0 otherwise. The control variables are as follows. *Month of Tenure* is the number of months that the party leader has been in office in the month of the election studied[11]. *GDP Growth Rate* is the percentage change in annual GDP from the previous year. Following Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2010), if the election occurs within the first 6 months of the year, the previous year's GDP growth rate is used. If the election occurs within the latter 6 months of the year, the current year's GDP growth rate is used[12]. For example, the 1997 UK General Election occurred in May of 1997. Because it was within the first 6 months of the year, I used the percent annual GDP change from 1995 to 1996. *Government*GDP Growth Rate* is an interaction variable, with the value

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[9] An alternative way of searching in Keesings Archives would be to use the party and the party leader's title. However, this process is more tedious as it yields more irrelevant results.

[10] I define the legislature as the Lower House if the country has a bicameral legislature.

[11] I calculate the number of months (full 30 days) that has passed since the party leader first took office. If the date of month that the party leader took office is within 15 days of the date of month of the election, I do not include the election month in my calculation, otherwise the month is included. For example, Gordon Brown became the Leader of the Labour Party on June 24th, 2007. Since the UK held the general election on May 6th, 2010, I do not count May in the total number of months that Brown has been a leader (34 months, or 2 years and 10 months) because only 12 days has passed between the 24th of April and the 6th of May.

[12] From 1945 to 2000, annual GDP is standardized in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. From 2000 to 2009, annual GDP is standardized in 2000 constant prices, PPP-adjusted.

as the GDP growth rate if the party is in government and 0 otherwise. *In Government* is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the party holds at least 1 seat in the last cabinet before the election[13], and 0 otherwise. Because voters may evaluate government parties differently, and ruling status may exert different effects on policy position and election outcomes, I interact this variable with all other control variables. *Single Member Districts* is a binary variable coded 1 if the electoral district can only elect one representative to the legislature, and 0 otherwise. *Year of Election* is the year that the election is held: this controls for possible time-related vote share trends.

I also include the following control variables. *Left Party* is a binary variable with the value of 1 if CMP codes the party as Social Democratic or Socialist, and 0 otherwise. I include lagged dependent variables as controls in order to address potential serial correlation. *Vote Share Change t-1* is the percent change in the official party vote share of the previous election (t-1) from two elections before the current election (t-2). *Magnitude L-R Change t-*1 is the absolute change in the party's left-right ideology in t-1 from t-2. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) point out that parties who moderate their ideology in the previous election increase their vote shares in the current election. To examine whether this is nested in *New Leader*, I constructed a variable called *Change in Moderation t-1*, which is the degree of the party's left-right ideological moderation during the previous election ((t-1) − (t-2)). A negative score means that the party was more extreme (moved toward -100 if the party is a left-leaning party, and closer to +100 if the party is a right-leaning party) on the left-right ideological continuum, while a positive score means that the party was more moderate (moved toward 0) on the scale. It is also possible that the ideological change itself may affect vote share (Tavits 2007). Thus, in models with vote share as the dependent variable, I include *Magnitude of Left-Right Policy Change* as a control.

3.1.4. SMD as a Control Variable

I now investigate whether it is indeed reasonable to include *Single Member District* as a control variable. Duverger (1954) argues that single-member districts (SMD) may encourage two-party systems. They may also foster single-party governments. If voters generally choose from two parties, the number of swing voters may be higher, and the vote shares that a party receives across elections may be more volatile. On the other hand, since there are generally more parties in countries with multi-member districts, it is possible that vote shares are more volatile in multi-member districts (MMDs) because there are more choices. Table 3 shows that the maximum vote share change and absolute left-right policy change are higher for non-single member districts (20 versus 18 points and 70 versus 50

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[13] If the parliament is dissolved when the election is held, then I examine the composition of the last official cabinet prior to the election.

points, respectively). While a student's t-test cannot reject the null hypotheses that there is no difference in the mean vote share change for single member districts and non-single member districts (p = 0.17), or difference in the mean in absolute left-right policy change for single member districts and non-single member districts (p = 0.11), the difference in the medians and standard deviations are large. Table 4 describes the differences in *New Leader* statistics between countries employing SMDs and those that employ MMDs. Not only do countries using MMDs have more new party leaders, but, contrary to the SMD cases, they also have more opposition party leaders than government party leaders. Thus, I believe that it is justifiable to include *Single Member District* as a control variable.

[TABLES 3 & 4 HERE]

3.2 Results

In the following analyses, I interact *In Government* with the control variables. For models with *Party Vote Share Change* as the dependent variable, I also construct a triple interaction variable with *In Government*, *New Leader*, and *Single Member Districts*. Since Japan's LDP elect new party leaders much more often than other parties, it is possible that these observations change the effects of *New Leader*. I analyzed the dataset with all Japan observations removed and found no major differences in *New Leader*. Thus, I only present results including the Japanese observations. I also conduct all statistical analyses using both definitions of a party leader and find that all variables behave similarly, with similar significance levels and no large differences in the coefficients. The analyses suggest that alternative definitions of a party leader do not alter the overall results. At the same time, since only 13 of 363 cases are affected, it is plausible that the number of affected cases is too low. Nevertheless, since the analyses show no significance differences, I only present results with the first definition of party leader, not the definition that requires a leader to be the *de facto* prime minister or chancellor candidate[14].

3.2.1 The Effect of New Leader on Party Vote Share Change

Table 5 presents regression analyses of fully specified models with the triple interaction variable and with standard errors clustered by election. Since the results with country- and party-fixed effects show no significant differences from those with clustered standard errors, I only present models with clustered standard errors by election[15]. A quick glance of the results shows that while *New Leader* exerts neither significant nor large effects

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[14] Results without the Japanese observations, as well as those with the alternative definition of a party leader, are available upon request.

[15] Results available upon request.

in any of the models, the triple interaction variable is positive with quite large coefficients. On average, the presence of new government party leaders in SMDs increases the party's vote share by the range of 3% to 4%. However, *New Leader*Government* gains significance ($p < 0.05$ or $p < 0.01$) in all models: on average, the presence of new government party leaders reduces the party's vote by 5% to 6%. Together, these variables imply a counter-balancing effect between government status and SMDs: new party leaders in SMDs tend to increase vote share, while new government party leaders tend to decrease vote share. This effect may cause *New Leader*'s coefficient to be small and insignificant.

[TABLE 5 HERE]

These results suggest that it is useful to split the dataset into SMD and MMD electoral systems. Thus, I conduct the following statistical analyses with split samples, *In Government* interactions, and clustered standard errors by election. Results for the SMD cases are presented in Table 6, while results for the MMD cases are presented in Table 7. In both tables, Model 1 contains no policy controls; Model 2 controls for the levels of ideological moderation at the previous election; Model 3 controls for the magnitude of ideological change at the previous election; Model 4 controls for the levels of ideological moderation at the current election; finally, Model 5 controls for the magnitude of ideological change at the current election. All findings are robust to country and party fixed effects[16].

I first discuss results for the SMD cases. First, *New Leader* is positive and significant ($p < 0.1$) in all models except Model 4. In Model 1, parties who elect new leaders before an election on average gain about 2% in vote share from the previous election. In the models with policy controls, on average, parties who elected new leaders increase their votes by 2% to 3%, depending on the model. Second, similar to the models with the triple interaction variable, *New Leader*Government* exerts negative and significant effects on the party's vote share. In Model 1, on average, new government party leaders lower their parties' votes by 4%. In the models with policy controls, this effect is -4.3% to -4.6%, depending on the model. These results support the above expectation that the effects of SMDs and ruling status counterbalance each other. Moreover, it suggests that opposition parties gain votes by selecting new leaders since after controlling for new government party leaders, the presence of new party leaders increase votes.

The control variables behave in the following manner. First, *Month of Tenure* is insignificant and has the same coefficient (0) in all models except Model 4, suggesting that this variable has no effect on vote share. Second, all policy controls and their interactions with *In Government* exert small and insignificant effects on vote share (the coefficients range from -0.07 to 0.11). Third, neither of the economic controls influences vote share in any model. This is not surprising for *GDP Growth Rate*. However, the fact that

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[16] Results available upon request.

Government*GDP Growth Rate is also insignificant points to the possibility that *New Leader* may have picked up potential negative effects that lower growth rates have on the government party's vote share. In other words, if government parties replace leaders during a bad economy to minimize economic voting, then the negative GDP growth's effect on government parties' vote shares would be nested in *New Leader*. Fourth, *In Government* exerts a negative and significant effect ($p < 0.05$) on vote share, between 3% to 5%, depending on the model. This is not surprising since it is in line with many research results. Also, government parties who gain 1% vote share during the last election on average lose 0.18% to 0.24% of votes, though the effect is small in Models 1 and 4. Fifth, leftist parties also on average significantly lose 1.5% to 2.3% of votes, depending on the model. However, in Models 1, 2, and 3, leftist government parties on average gain 2.3% to 2.6% of votes ($p < 0.1$). This suggests that left wing parties who are out of government on average lose more votes than non-leftist parties. Finally, *Year of Election* is insignificant in Models 1, 2, and 3, while exerting a small (-0.05 and -0.03) but significant ($p < .05$) effect in models controlling for current ideological changes (Models 4 and 5, respectively).

[TABLE 6 HERE]

The MMD observations display a different set of results. Table 7[17] shows that the presence of new party leaders significantly lowers their parties' vote shares in MMD countries. In the model with no policy controls, parties with new leaders on average lose 3.5% of vote shares from the previous election. In the models with policy controls, parties with new leaders on average lose 3% to 4% of votes, depending on the model. This effect seems to be more pronounced for opposition parties since *New Leader*Government* is insignificant in all models except Models 1 and 3 ($p < 0.1$). In Model 1, government parties who elected new leaders on average lose 3.8% of votes, while in Model 3, government parties with new party leaders on average lose 3.5% of votes.

The control variables also behave differently in analyses with only MMD observations. While *In Government* exerts a more negative and significant effect on vote share (on average, losing from 5% to 6% of votes), *Government*GDP Growth Rate* is now significant ($p < 0.01$) across all models. For government parties, a 1% increase in GDP growth rate on average significantly increases vote shares by around 1%. Left parties operating in MMDs on average significantly *gain* 2.8% to 3.4% of vote shares. Meanwhile, left parties in government on average lose 2% to 3% of votes, depending on the model. This variable is also significant in all models except Models 2 and 3, suggesting that the type of electoral system may advantage some type of parties more than others.

[TABLE 7 HERE]

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[17] Statistical analyses of these models using the alternative definition show no major differences from those in Table 7. Results available upon request.

3.2.2 The Effect of New Leader on the Magnitude of Left-Right Position Change

      I now present regression results for the dependent variable *Magnitude of Left-Right Policy Change*. Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2010) find that government parties can gain more votes when their election manifestos state a more extreme policy position, while opposition parties do not. Thus, it is reasonable to examine whether party policy positions can be affected by government status in a variety of contexts. Table 8 contains regression results with *In Government* interactions and with standard errors clustered by election (Model 2), country-fixed effects (Model 3), and party-fixed effects (Model 4)[18]. In all models, *New Leader* exerts significant and positive effects on the magnitude of left-right ideological change. In the model with clustered standard errors, the presence of new leaders is correlated with an absolute shift in the party's left-right ideological position by an average of 5 points. This result is robust for country- and party-fixed effects. However, the presence of new government party leaders does not significantly change the position, suggesting that the correlation rests with opposition party leaders. None of the interaction variables significantly affects policy change except *Government*Left Party* in the model with clustered standard errors, where a leftist government party on average changes its ideological position by 5 points *less* than others. Interestingly, the coefficient for *Year of Election* is -0.1 across all models (p < 0.05). A party in an election held 10 years later on average changes their ideological position by less than 1 point. This suggests a stabilizing effect of time: as more time has passed, parties become slightly more entrenched in their left-right ideology.

[TABLE 8 HERE]

4. Discussion

4.1. Implications of Results

4.1.1. Electoral Institutions Matter

      In countries with SMDs, the presence of new opposition leaders seems to help the party's electoral fortune, while in countries with multi-member districts, their presence seems to hurt the party. This implies that party leaders have different impacts in different electoral systems. However, I have not found literature that addresses this possibility. A potential explanation for this finding is that due to the norm of coalition government, parties operating in a MMD system may place the highest importance on their leader's negotiating skills, while parties operating in SMDs may view personality traits as the most important skill for a leader. Thus, in MMD systems, new party leaders may not possess favorable personality traits, while

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[18] The results remain largely the same when I drop the Japan observations from my analyses, or when I use the alternative definition of a party leader. Results available upon request.

those in countries with SMDs are more likely to have these traits. However, there is no reason why these two types of qualities are mutually exclusive. A related explanation can be that the lack of leadership experience hurts opposition parties in MMD systems, but does not do significant harm to those in SMD systems. It is not unreasonable to think that party leaders bear more responsibility in a MMD system, where party leaders are not only responsible for being the party's policy spokesperson, but may also be involved in establishing a party list, negotiating with potential coalition partners, etc. New leaders without much experience may be more likely to fail in these aspects, thus hurting the party image and the party's vote share. In contrast, these skills may not be crucial for party leaders in the SMD context, and thus the lack of experience is not necessarily detrimental to the party's electoral fortune. However, this does not explain why the change in opposition party leaders in a SMD system on average increase the party's vote share.

A more plausible explanation is that the circumstances that prompt a leadership selection process for parties operating in MMD systems, and the process of selection itself, differ from those for parties operating in SMDs. It may be the case that party organization in MMD systems is less democratic, such that decision-making power is concentrated within the top-ranking officers. Party leaders in this context are more immune to pressures to step down. It is also possible that coalition governments are more likely to form under MMD systems. Since a party's inability to enter government after an election loss is also in part due to other parties' choice to not enter into a coalition agreement, the party places less blame on the leader in such circumstance. Thus, in MMDs the removal of a party leader is a sign of intra-party crisis, which negatively affects the quality of the new party leader and voter perception of the party[19]. In contrast, in SMDs the selection of new party leaders may be a routine method that opposition parties use to improve the party image and increase vote share, and/or that it is easier for parties to fault their leader for an election loss. As a result, a new opposition party leader operating in SMDs is more likely to attract votes than one operating in MMDs.

One implication of this explanation is that party leadership tenure in SMDs is shorter than tenure in MMDs. Table 9 presents a Cox-proportional hazard model for leadership exit, which shows that even controlling for opposition party status and the party's exit from government, party leaders of countries employing SMDs has a higher hazard ratio (2.31) than leaders of countries employing MMDs. Another implication is that for opposition parties, the interval between an election loss and the selection of a new party leader is shorter for SMD systems than MMD systems. While statistical testing of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, the data required to test this are available. These implications also suggest that an endogeneity problem exists, which I discuss below.

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[19] Ezrow (2007) finds that party disunity does in fact decrease the party's vote share.

[TABLE 9 HERE]

4.1.2. Government Status and the Economy

It is worthwhile to note that new government party leaders seem to hurt the party's vote share. Since government parties tend to lose votes due to reversion to the mean, the presence of new leaders may contribute to this loss by virtue of their ruling status. Or, new government party leaders can be a manifestation of intraparty crises, which may negatively affect vote share. Unless outmaneuvered by their rank-and-file, prime ministers are unlikely to resign except for health reasons because they have the resources to co-opt their opponents[20]. These conflicts could be the omitted variable that explains vote share loss, though it is also possible that new government party leaders are less able to attenuate intraparty crises. More analyses are needed to disentangle these potential effects.

The finding that in countries with SMDs, neither of the economic controls significantly affects vote shares is puzzling. There are two possibilities for this. The first is that economic conditions predict the selection of new party leaders, who then contribute to the party's vote loss not because they exert an independent effect, but because adverse economic conditions prompt their selection. If this is indeed the case, then I will need an instrumental variable that predicts the selection of a new party leader, but which the economic variables cannot predict. Nevertheless, it is perhaps comforting that growth in GDP significantly increases government parties' vote shares in MMD contexts. The significance of *New Leader* in these contexts does not seem to be the result of a possible endogenous relationship between economic conditions and party leadership replacement. For the SMD cases, one possibility is that leadership effects persist even when the economy is taken into account. As Vavreck (2009) argues, a bad economy in itself does not necessarily dampen a ruling party's vote share. Rather, how parties and presidential candidates frame the economic context matters a great deal in their ability to win elections. If so, then this further suggests that new party leaders independently affect election outcomes.

4.2 Omitted Variables and the Endogeneity Problem

The above discussion suggests that in SMDs, leadership change may be endogenous to the economy. Government parties may select new leaders when the economy worsens to salvage votes, while opposition parties may select new leaders when the economy is good to attract voters. Intra-party crises may be another omitted variable: parties who go through intra-party strife select new leaders. In addition to potential omitted variables, my statistical

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[20] For example, prime ministers can reshuffle their cabinets to co-opt potential adversaries and reduce ministers' moral hazard (Kam and Indridason 2005; 2007).

analyses may also suffer from endogeneity: past election vote shares may predict *New Leader*. This may account for why *Party Vote Share Change at t-1* has small and statistically insignificant coefficients. This endogeneity problem may not be too serious if past election results do not predict the current election results. Indeed, regressing vote share with all variables except *New Leader* and its interaction variables shows that this is the case. Nonetheless, this problem, along with the aforementioned ones, point to the need for an instrumental variable that is correlated with *New Leader* but is not affected by vote share.

One solution is to use subsamples—separating party leaders that I can determine for certain were replaced due to health reasons or death, and only include new party leaders that took power out of these circumstances in my statistical analyses. However, in my dataset, I can determine with certainty only 17 party leaders who have been replaced due to these reasons. The small number makes this approach impractical.

There are two potential instrumental variables that I have unsuccessfully tried. The first is term limit. If term limit forces the party to replace leaders, then the existence of a new leader would, presumably, not be due to the economy, intra-party crises, and/or past election results. However, the problem with using this variable is that the only party that applies term limits to the party leadership is Japan's LDP. Thus, term limits will not significantly predict *New Leader* in all other parties. The second variable is the age of the previous leader. If a party leader has been replaced or has retired due to age, then it is likely that the reason for a leadership selection is not due to a bad economy, intra-party strife, or a bad election outcome. In addition, the age of the party leader is easily obtainable. I constructed Cox Proportional Hazard models to see if a leader's age is associated with his or her hazard rate of exit. Controlling for opposition party status and the loss of government status, in Westminster systems, age is significantly associated with the proportional hazard rate of exit. However, the effect is quite small and runs in the opposite direction: a leader that is one month older has a hazard rate that is 95% of a leader that is one month younger. Moreover, in non-Westminster systems, age does not significantly alter the leader's exit hazard rate. These results suggest that age of the previous leader is not the appropriate instrumental variable to predict *New Leader* without predicting vote shares.

Since it is difficult to separate the independent effects of new party leaders on election outcomes, I can benefit from a more generous interpretation of the effects of *New Leader* to dampen the endogeneity problem. One interpretation is to accept that the presence of new party leaders may be reflecting the circumstances that the party is in, and these circumstances influence how new party leaders affect election outcomes. This prompts the question: why do parties replace their leaders? One plausible explanation may be that losing an election—meaning, the party fails to enter into government—personal scandals, and/or policy failure serves as a signal of the party leader's quality. Once the party receives the signal, it then

makes a decision about whether or not to replace its leader. Further disentangling of intra-party crisis dynamics is necessary to test the validity of this explanation.

5. Conclusion

This study has examined how the presence of a new party leader affects the party's left-right ideological position and vote share in the next general election. Using an original dataset of party leadership in 10 OECD countries, I first find that the presence of a new government party leader on average decreases the party's vote share in a general election. Second, in countries using SMDs, a new opposition party leader on average increases the party's vote share, while the opposite applies in countries not using SMDs. Finally, the presence of a new opposition party leader is correlated with a change in the party's left-right ideological position.

The above suggests that electoral institution significantly shapes how an opposition party leader influences the party's vote share. At the same time, it also points out potential omitted variables and endogeneity problems. Mainly, intraparty crises may alter an election outcome through changing leaders. Investigating the circumstances behind party leadership turnover will be essential in understanding the relationship between party leadership and democratic elections.

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Tables

Table 1: List of Parties and Time Periods Studied						
Country	**Left-Wing Party**	**Years Studied**	**Centrist Party?**	**Years Studied**	**Right-Wing Party**	**Years Studied**
Australia	Australian Labor Party (ALP)	1945 – 2009	N/A	N/A	Liberal Party of Australia	1945 – 2009
Canada	Liberal Party of Canada	1948 - 2009	N/A	N/A	Progressive Conservative Party (called the Conservative Party after 2004)	1948 - 2009
Ireland (not traditional L-R)	Fianna Fáil	1948 – 2009	N/A	N/A	Fine Gael	1944 – 2009
Germany	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)	1949 – 2009	N/A	N/A	Sozialdemokrat-ische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	1949 - 2009
Japan	Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	1996-2009	N/A	N/A	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	1960 - 2009
New Zealand	New Zealand Labour Party	1951 – 2009	N/A	N/A	New Zealand National Party	1949 - 2009
Portugal	Partido Socialista	1974 – 2009	N/A	N/A	Partido Social Democrata	1973 - 2009
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	1976 - 2009	N/A	N/A	Alianza Popopular (called Partido Popular 1989 – present)	1976 - 2009
Sweden	Sveriges socialdemokr-atiska arbetareparti	1949 - 2009	Centerpa-rtiet	1948 – 2009	Moderata samlingspart-iet (Moderate party)	1944 – 2009
United Kingdom	Labour Party	1945 - 2009	N/A	N/A	Conservative Party	1955 – 2009

Table 2: List of Party Leaders' Official Title	
Party	**Party Leader's Official Title**
Australian Labor Party	Federal Leader of the Labor Party
Liberal Party of Australia	Liberal Federal Leaders
Liberal Party of Canada	Leader of the Liberal Party
Conservative Party of Canada	Leader of the Conservative Party
Fianna Fáil	Fianna Fáil Taoisigh
Fine Gael	Leader of Fine Gael
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)	CDU-Vorsitzender
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	SPD-Vorsitzender
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	President of LDP
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	President of DPJ
New Zealand Labour Party	Leader of the New Zealand Labour Party
New Zealand National Party	Leader of the New Zealand National Party
Partido Socialista	Secretários-Gerais
Partido Social Democrata	Presidência da Comissão Política Nacional do Partido Social Democrata
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	Secretário General
Alianza Popopular (until 1989) Partido Popular (1989 – present)	Presidente del Alianza Popular Presidente del Partido Popular
Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	Partiordförande för socialdemokraterna
Centerpartiet	Partiordförande
Moderata samlingspartiet	Partiordförande
Labour Party	Leader of the Labour Party
Conservative Party	Leader of the Conservative Party

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Single Member Districts and DVs				
DV	**% Party Vote Share Change for SMDs**	**% Party Vote Share Change for MMDs**	**Magnitude of L-R Policy Change for SMDs**	**Magnitude of L-R Policy Change for MMDs**
Median	-0.30	-0.04	10	9.38
Mean	0.30	0.32	12.12	13.82
Standard Deviation	5.74	6.33	9.62	14.36
Maximum	17.58 (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada) (1984 General Election)	20.49 (Spanish AP) (1982 General Elections)	49.5 (Liberal Party of Australia) (1963 General Election)	69.3 (Ireland's Fine Gael) (1961 General Election)
Minimum	-26.98 (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada) (1993 General Election)	-21.04 (Japan's LDP) (2009 General Election)	0.28 (New Zealand National Party) (1966 General Election)	0 (6 parties total)
# Obs	160	182	151	157

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Single Member Districts and New Leaders					
Electoral System	**# Obs**	**# Elections Held**	**# New Leaders**	**# New Gov't Party Leaders**	**# New Opp Party Leaders**
SMD	169	120	169	89	80
MMD	194	88	190	84	106

Table 5: Leadership Effects on Party Vote Share Change, Clustered SE by Election					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Month of Tenure	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
New Leader	-0.77	-0.84	-0.85	-0.66	-0.29
	(1.11)	(1.16)	(1.15)	(1.09)	(1.05)
Government * New Leader * Single Party Districts	4.11*	3.68*	3.84*	3.33	3.50
	(2.05)	(2.17)	(2.10)	(2.19)	(2.12)
New Leader * Government	-6.16***	-5.67***	-6.09***	-5.24**	-5.63***
	(1.83)	(1.98)	(1.98)	(2.07)	(2.05)
Government * Single Member Districts	-1.51	-1.40	-1.30	-1.43	-1.46
	(1.44)	(1.49)	(1.52)	(1.56)	(1.59)
Government * Left Party	-0.26	0.03	0.13	-0.23	-0.53
	(1.04)	(1.11)	(1.14)	(1.13)	(1.22)
Government * Vote Share Change at $t-1$	-0.11	-0.09	-0.08	-0.18*	-0.17*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Government * Moderation t-1		0.03			
		(0.03)			
Government * L-R Change t-1			0.06		
			(0.06)		
Government * Moderation				-0.03	
				(0.03)	
Government * L-R Change					0.01
					(0.06)
Moderation t-1		-0.02			
		(0.03)			
L-R Change t-1			0.00		
			(0.04)		
Moderation				0.03	
				(0.03)	
L-R Change					-0.05
					(0.04)
In Government	-3.32**	-3.32**	-4.04**	-3.24**	-3.03
	(1.35)	(1.49)	(1.77)	(1.51)	(1.90)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.16	-0.16	-0.17	-0.19	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Government * GDP Growth Rate	0.30	0.27	0.24	0.31	0.30
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Single Member Districts	-0.44	-0.49	-0.50	-0.56	-0.66
	(0.96)	(0.99)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.05)
Party Vote Share Change at $t-1$	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.07	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Year of Election	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left Party	0.20	0.25	0.32	0.64	0.72
	(0.77)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.82)	(0.83)
Japan	2.70	2.82*	2.77	2.63	2.65
	(1.65)	(1.66)	(1.69)	(1.85)	(1.81)
Constant	23.89	25.22	21.96	66.26**	78.54**
	(27.69)	(29.64)	(32.93)	(27.51)	(29.50)
# Observations	317	305	305	286	286
R-square	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.19

Table 6: Leadership Effects on Party Vote Share Change for SMDs, Clustered SE by Election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Month of Tenure	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
New Leader	2.38*	2.52*	2.41*	1.86	2.27*
	(1.25)	(1.32)	(1.27)	(1.20)	(1.30)
New Leader * Government	-4.36*	-4.53**	-4.60**	-4.33*	-4.31*
	(2.22)	(2.20)	(2.18)	(2.27)	(2.31)
Government * Left Party	2.34*	2.54*	2.57*	2.46	2.11
	(1.37)	(1.42)	(1.47)	(1.50)	(1.50)
Government * Vote Share Change at $t-1$	-0.23*	-0.20	-0.18	-0.24*	-0.24*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Government * Moderation t-1		0.02			
		(0.04)			
Government * L-R Change t-1			0.11		
			(0.11)		
Government * Moderation				0.01	
				(0.05)	
Government * L-R Change					0.10
					(0.09)
Moderation t-1		0.00			
		(0.04)			
L-R Change t-1			-0.03		
			(0.08)		
Moderation				0.05	
				(0.05)	
L-R Change					-0.07
					(0.07)
In Government	-3.25**	-3.19*	-4.51**	-2.80*	-3.94**
	(1.59)	(1.67)	(2.22)	(1.62)	(1.72)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.00
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Government * GDP Growth Rate	-0.01	-0.22	-0.20	-0.30	-0.25
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Party Vote Share Change at $t-1$	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Year of Election	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left Party	-2.33**	-2.22**	-2.10**	-1.89*	-1.50*
	(0.97)	(1.01)	(1.78)	(0.94)	(0.89)
Japan	3.10	3.23	2.71	3.40*	3.14
	(1.90)	(1.94)	(1.78)	(1.90)	(1.99)
Constant	45.34	47.51	46.59	92.50**	71.01*
	(39.90)	(44.21)	(46.11)	(42.20)	(40.62)
# Observations	151	145	145	141	141
R-square	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.22

Table 7: Leadership Effects on Party Vote Share Change for MMDs, Clustered SE by Election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Month of Tenure	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
New Leader	-3.53**	-3.87**	-3.78**	-3.08*	-2.76*
	(1.60)	(1.70)	(1.73)	(1.60)	(1.46)
New Leader * Government	-3.82*	-3.14	-3.51*	-3.68	-3.88
	(1.96)	(2.06)	(2.08)	(2.38)	(2.36)
Government * Left Party	-2.46*	-2.25	-2.25	-2.74*	-3.32**
	(1.37)	(1.48)	(1.50)	(1.44)	(1.49)
Government * Vote Share Change at t − 1	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.15	-0.09
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Government * Moderation t-1		0.03			
		(0.04)			
Government * L-R Change t-1			0.01		
			(0.09)		
Government * Moderation				-0.01	
				(0.04)	
Government * L-R Change					-0.37
					(0.27)
Moderation t-1		-0.02			
		(0.03)			
L-R Change t-1			0.01		
			(0.05)		
Moderation				0.00	
				(0.03)	
L-R Change					-0.02
					(0.04)
In Government	-5.94***	-6.31***	-6.43***	-6.37***	-5.16**
	(1.66)	(1.73)	(2.12)	(1.82)	(2.24)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.29	-0.22	-0.25	-0.32	-0.37
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Government * GDP Growth Rate	1.02***	1.02***	1.04***	1.17***	1.18***
	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Party Vote Share Change at t − 1	-0.05	-0.09	-0.08	0.06	-0.04
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Year of Election	0.00	0.00	0.03	-0.03	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left Party	2.76**	2.85**	2.88**	3.26***	3.37***
	(2.65)	(1.22)	(1.21)	(1.16)	(1.15)
Japan	4.35	4.92*	4.94*	3.81	4.65
	(2.65)	(2.82)	(2.82)	(3.62)	(3.58)
Constant	2.65	17.88	11.38	53.89	89.11*
	(33.29)	(32.62)	(39.08)	(37.42)	(44.43)
# Observations	166	160	160	145	145
R-square	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.32

Table 8: Leadership Effects on the Magnitude of CMP Left-Right Change				
	(1)	(2) Clustered SE	(3) Country Fixed	(4) Party Fixed
Month of Tenure	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
New Leader	3.21* (1.60)	4.93** (1.91)	5.09** (2.34)	5.21** (2.41)
Government * New Leader		-4.36 (3.66)	-3.72 (3.21)	-3.73 (3.29)
Government * Single Member Districts		0.25 (2.81)	0.55 (2.95)	2.22 (3.17)
Government * Left Party		-4.75* (2.50)	-3.88 (3.26)	-4.28 (3.28)
Government * Vote Share Change at t – 1		0.41 (0.31)	0.41 (0.27)	0.42 (0.28)
Absolute L-R Change t - 1	0.15 (0.10)	0.14 (0.10)	0.11* (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
In Government	1.17 (1.64)	4.36 (3.06)	3.40 (2.75)	1.15 (3.00)
Single Member Districts	-2.09 (1.65)	-2.61 (2.01)	-2.81 (4.46)	-4.83 (4.62)
Vote Share Change at t – 1	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.20)
Year of Election	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)
Left Party	-1.43 (1.30)	0.70 (1.72)	0.84 (2.26)	
Japan	1.07 (3.13)	2.13 (3.60)		
Constant	278.03*** (88.93)	288.89*** (95.94)	280.88** (109.79)	280.16** (109.68)
# Obs	286	286	286	286
R-square: Within Between Overall	0.08	0.10	0.08 0.56 0.10	0.07 0.27 0.08

Table 9: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of SMD and Party Leadership Exit	
Variable	Hazard Ratio
Single Member Districts	2.31*** (0.43)
Opposition Party	5.21*** (1.00)
Party's Exit from Government	31.28*** (9.38)
Age	0.97*** (0.01)
Ideologically Left Party	0.82 (0.15)
Was Party Leader in a Previous Term	3.15*** (1.33)
Log Likelihood	-1132
# Obs	12448

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics

Tables A1 to A4 present descriptive statistics for my dependent and explanatory variables. Of the 359 observations considered, 153 of them have party leaders without previous election experiences (approximately 40%). Table A1 shows that in every country except for Japan and the UK, there are more opposition party leaders than government party leaders.

Table A1: New Leaders, by Country					
Country	**# Obs**	**# Elections**	**# New Party Leaders**	**# New Leaders in Government Parties**	**# New Leaders in Opposition Parties**
Australia	50	25	20	5	15
Canada	42	21	17	5	12
Germany	33	17	13	5	8
Ireland	35	18	13	4	9
Japan	21	11	17	11	5
New Zealand	44	22	14	5	9
Portugal	24	12	13	5	8
Spain	20	10	6	0	6
Sweden	56	19	18	4	14
United Kingdom	34	17	12	6	6

Table A2 shows that the median party vote share change is -0.2%. Although this number seems low, the median absolute vote share change is 3%, while the median percentage changes in vote loss and vote gain are -3% and 3%, respectively, suggesting that the low percentage change may be due to the counterbalancing of winning and losing vote shares.

Table A2 Descriptive Statistics for Party Vote Share Change				
Variable	**Party Vote Share Change (by %)**	**Absolute Vote Share Change**	**Change in Vote Loss**	**Change in Vote Gain**
Median	-0.21	3.37	-3.15	3.45
Mean	0.026	4.41	-4.26	4.61
Std Dev	6.06	4.15	4.12	4.19
Max	20.49 (Spanish Aliance Popular, 1982 General Election)	26.98 (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1993 General Election)	-26.98 (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1993 General Election)	20.49 (Spanish Aliance Popular, 1982 General Election)
Min	-26.98 (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1993 General Election)	0 (Ireland's Fianna Fáil, 1989 General Election)	-0.08 (Sweden's Social Democrat, 1952 General Election)	0.06 (Ireland's Fianna Fáil, 2007 General Election)
# Obs	342	342	176	165

Table A3, which presents the descriptive statistics by country, shows that there are intra- and inter-country differences. Japan presents the only anomaly within *New Leader*: 81% of their cases have new party leaders standing for elections.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics, by Country				
Variable	Party Vote Share Change (by percentage) (median, mean, Standard Deviation)	Magnitude of Left-Right Policy Change (median, mean, Stdev)	Month of Tenure (median, mean, Standard Deviation)	New Leader (median, mean)
Australia	-0.25, 0.03, 4.08 (48 observations)	11.90, 14.60, 10.27 (44 observations)	47, 60.08, 51.32 (50 observations)	0, 0.40 (50 observations)
Canada	0.44, -0.09, 8.64 (40 observations)	9.65, 9.78, 6.50 (34 observations)	50, 54.86, 55.59 (42 observations)	0, 0.40 (42 observations)
Germany	-0.79, -0.11, 4.69 (32 observations)	6.7, 12.73, 13.82 (28 observations)	67, 98.18, 84.32 (33 observations)	0, 0.39 (33 observations)
Ireland	1.20, 0.21, 4.35 (34 observations)	11.75, 18.00, 17.66 (32 observations)	64, 67.71, 40.00 (35 observations)	0, 0.37 (35 observations)
Japan	-1.06, -0.23, 7.82 (20 observations)	16.84, 14.45, 10.38 (16 observations)	13.00, 20.29, 17.36 (21 observations)	1, 0.81 (21 observations)
New Zealand	-0.48, -0.49, 6.15 (42 observations)	7.62, 11.21, 11.26 (38 observations)	60, 65.91, 48.69 (44 observations)	0, 0.32 (44 observations)
Portugal	0.36, 0.29, 10.57 (22 observations)	10.66, 18.83, 20.26 (18 observations)	26, 44.17, 42.39 (24 observations)	1, 0.54 (24 observations)
Spain	0.12, 2.57, 7.44 (18 observations)	1.32, 6.52, 7.89 (14 observations)	76, 92.3, 73.62 (20 observations)	0, 0.30 (20 observations)
Sweden	-0.37, -0.03, 3.58 (54 observations)	10.10, 12.52, 10.32 (51 observations)	68, 83.66, 62.99 (56 observations)	0, 0.32 (56 observations)
United Kingdom	-0.30, -0.57, 4.82 (32 observations)	8.48, 11.11, 10.20 (33 observations)	68, 79.03, 60.06 (34 observations)	0, 035 (34 observations)

Table A4 breaks down CMP statistics by country and presents the median, mean, and standard deviation of interparty left-right ideology differences within an election. The country with the minimum median and mean difference is Spain, with 1 and 4 points, respectively. The maximum median and mean interparty difference is between the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party in Sweden, with 25 and 20 points, respectively. To give some meaning to these statistics, I offer an empirical example—the 1997 and 2001 UK General Elections. The former is considered a high profile election, in which the Labour Party won by a landslide after 18 years in opposition, while the latter resulted in a second Labour landslide victory. In 1997, with 43% of total votes, Tony Blair's Labour Party won the government status, while with 31% of total votes John Major's Conservative Party lost the status. Labour's change in the left-right position is 39 points, while Conservative's change is 2 points. The interparty difference is 20 points. In 2001, both parties' statuses remained unchanged and Labour's change is 2 points to the left, while the Conservative's change is 11 points to the left. The interparty difference for that election is 9 points. These data suggests that parties do shift their ideologies between successive elections.

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of CMP Data		
Variable	**median, mean, Standard Deviation**	**Inter-Party Change (median, mean, stdev)**
Australia	11.90, 14.60, 10.27 (44 observations)	16.6, 17.29, 12.06 (22 observations)
Canada	9.65, 9.78, 6.50 (34 observations)	9.60, 10.21, 6.96 (17 observations)
Germany	6.7, 12.73, 13.82 (28 observations)	11.69, 17.01, 21.26 (14 observations)
Ireland	11.75, 18.00, 17.66 (32 observations)	23.57, 30.14, 20.51 (16 observations)
Japan	16.84, 14.45, 10.38 (16 observations)	N/A
New Zealand	7.62, 11.21, 11.26 (38 observations)	14.1, 17.43, 14.37 (19 observations)
Portugal	10.66, 18.83, 20.26 (18 observations)	17.25, 24.72, 21.13 (9 Observations)
Spain	1.32, 6.52, 7.89 (14 observations)	1.45, 4.29, 5.70 (7 Observations)
Sweden	10.10, 12.52, 10.32 (51 observations)	Social Democrats – Moderate: 24.7, 19.76, 9.26 (17 Observations) Social Democrats – Center: 13.55, 15.26, 13.44 (17 Observations) Moderate – Center: 15.4, 16.78, 11.41 (17 Observations)
United Kingdom	8.48, 11.11, 10.20 (33 observations)	12.10, 15.12, 10.50 (15 Observations)